Robert Nelson is blogger-in-chief at History News, Notes and Arguments. Find us on Google+ or on Facebook.
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Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Sunday, September 29, 2013
France and the Ottoman Empire - Conclusion
Robert Nelson is blogger-in-chief at History News, Notes and Arguments. Find us on Google+ or on Facebook.
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Friday, September 20, 2013
France and the Ottoman Empire - Exoticism in the 17th Century
There are three methods that scholars use to treat the genre of the exotic in European literature. One method used by Ottoman historians before the 1980’s attempted to justify the importance of Ottoman history by proving how the Ottoman Empire affected European history. Such “post mortem apologies” have fallen out of fashion because the scholarly community has come to recognize the history of the Ottoman Empire is an important category of historical analysis. Another method relies strictly on the formal position of exotic Turks in French literature through a literary analysis. This method looks at their characters as role players within a particular work, and seeks to elucidate their function through close textual analysis. This method also rejects as equally important the political, social, and cultural critique contained within the work of literature, something that the third method takes up with zeal. Closer to Stephen Greenblatt’s “New Historicism,” this final method places literature in a particular context to show how contemporary form a dialogue with literature through the author’s purpose. This method provides the framework for this paper to understand exotic literature and the formation of a distinct French identity in opposition to this literature.
The division between France and the Orient was peripheral to the main concerns of the French in the construction of their own identity, because it was not nearly as immediate as concerns over Protestantism and the threat from Great Britain. However, increasingly frequent diplomatic and merchant contact with the Ottoman Empire led to frequent treatment of the Ottoman and the exotic in French written and staged literature from the 1630’s through the French Revolution. The obsession with the Ottomans infused into French culture an attitude that objectified the Turk as representative of “eastern” stereotypes through a mixture of envy and terror. By setting a binary opposition between Occident and Orient, French intellectuals provided a model by which French could define what they were and were not. French national identity was shaped in part by this early exotic discourse that sought to define what was French and occidental compared to what was Ottoman and oriental. However, as diplomatic and commercial contacts with the Ottomans increased throughout the eighteenth century, the treatment of the Ottoman in exotic literature became less frequent due to the discovery of more exotic populations, like the Peruvians or Tahitians by Bougainville and Cook. As the fear of the Ottoman military subsided, their representations became less frequent. Enlightenment literature turned to newer exotic lands, not-yet colonized or “civilized” by Europeans to make their arguments about civilization and human nature. At the end of the Enlightenment, the Turk came back under the French public eye after Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt and the rediscovery of the east, but the discourse was different. Now, informed by a century of Enlightenment philosophy and several years of French Revolutionary discourse about spreading civilization, the image of the Turk became inseparable from the European drive for colonial domination.
Without minimizing the importance of exotic discourse to identity formation, it is also important to keep in mind the French had a multitude of other identities against which to form themselves. David Bell’s point is well taken, that the relative proximity of Great Britain, the geo-political struggle that pitted the two at odds for longer than a century, the heated debates over religion and national superiority were probably the most important binary oppositions. Exotic discourse played a secondary role to anti-British sentiment due to the immediate nature of the British threat and the distance at which the Turks seemed for most ordinary Frenchmen outside of the Mediterranean Littoral. This lack of proximity prevented the Turk from entering into more politically charged debates in the eighteenth century, including those concerning religious toleration. It is important to keep in mind that the image of the Turk was not simply constructed from the French imagination, but informed by physical contact, however infrequent it might have been. While their representation in literature was distant and abstract, in the world of fashion and consumption the Turk left a lasting legacy through their brief visits to the Parisian high societies. What this suggests about French society, then, is that oriental style was a top-down phenomenon, beginning with the court and the courtly society, infused into theatrical representation as in Molière or Racine, and then permeated throughout French society with the theater being the operative mode of cultural reproduction.
Throughout the early modern era, the French came to see themselves as members of a common community, that of a national community. The eighteenth century marked a decisive era in the fomenting of a nationalist discourse. David Bell’s The Cult of the Nation in France highlights the binary opposition between Protestant Great Britain and Catholic France, and how French propagandists exploited the position of the British as the “other” against whom the French would form their identity. It is worth noting, however, that the nation as an end game is a contested discourse within academic circles, whose most fervent critic, Stephen Englund, referring to it as “The Ghost of Nation Past.” Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the scope and extent of national sentiment in France outside of the literate community, certainly in an age where the Abbé Grégoire could still count 1,001 different patois, or approximately one century before the historian Eugen Weber positions the most successful nation building program in French history. If we allow for a degree of nationalist rhetoric, then it is fruitful to examine the degree to which the Ottoman Empire figures into the construction of a French national identity. While there is certainly some truth highlighting the geopolitical struggle between France and Great Britain as integral to the formation of nationalist sentiments, it does not go far enough to account for the opposition between oriental and occidental.
Binary oppositions between the Orient and the Occident are not new to the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, as far back as Plato there is recognition of the possibility that the Persian’s belong to an eastern culture, while Greek culture is fundamentally different. The opposition was made between the Roman Empire of the west and the barbarian hordes of the east. The rise of Islam in the east and the crusading mentality in the west gave an added religious rhetoric to this opposition. Indeed, Norman Daniel and Debra Higgs Strickland maintain that Christian attitudes towards Islam were largely solidified in a religious rhetoric by the high Middle Ages. Italian humanists stripped religion from the equation by focusing on the Turks as barbarians. Although the renaissance humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries dealt with the Turk on an intellectual level, it was in some senses informed by an immediate fear of their proximity. Michèle Longino remarks that the Turk was evaluated with a mixture of admiration and terror: admiration for Suleiman, fear of Barbarossa. As the immediate fear of the Ottoman threat from the east subsided, the French were able to settle into a “neighborly” relationship based upon a cultural “inquisitiveness.”
Before continuing with Longino’s study of seventeenth century exotic, one must stop to examine the nature of the concept. Edward Said’s now classic Orientalism (1977) defines the term to mean the exchange between academic and imaginative ways of dividing Orient and Occident as “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing...in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.” Orientalism as a series of connected discourses posited the superiority of the Occident to the Orient, ultimately allowing for physical European colonial domination over the subject areas. Said maintained that the late eighteenth century saw an “Oriental Renaissance” at which point European scholars suddenly became aware of the vast Orient “from China to the Mediterranean,” that relied upon older European texts and was infused with new European ventures into the east. Ultimately, for Said, Orientalism was “a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”).”
The most important critique to his framework is the connection he draws between the Orientalist discourse and the colonial mentality. Many scholars claim that, especially for the eighteenth century treatment of the exotic, colonial or imperial mentality is not yet evident and any attempt to locate it properly within the bounds of exotic discourse is risking teleology. Furthermore, the subject of eighteenth century colonial domination was a peripheral discourse, taken up by less important authors and intellectuals and not nearly as much by those who properly treat exoticism. Finally, scholars like Tzvetan Todorov reject any attempt to link the history of ideas to the actions they may have inspired, in a sense building a theoretical fence between intellectual and political history. John Mckenzie takes up the same critique, but modifies it by suggesting that Orientalism after Said is too closely tied to a political agenda, and that far from participating in a project of cultural and intellectual domination, Orientalists are engaged in a project of significance limited to the academic world. These critiques fall short of modifying Said’s thesis that locates colonial domination within a discursive subjugation.
While Said’s Orientalism rests on the assumption that European “discovery” of the Orient motivated its development, Michèle Longino and Fatma Göçek each show how the debates over the east came as a result of physical contacts between the two. While Göçek claims that the Ottoman embassies in Paris produced only ephemeral interest among French elites, Longino instead argues that contact between the Ottomans and the French resulted in a codifying of attitudes towards the east. The seminal works of Corneille, Racine and Molière were precursors of Orientalism, and their reproduction in the theater provided the French with a literal staging of the “other” that, through repetition and its role in education helped the French construct their identity. Longino begins by identifying the exotic as inherently interesting to a seventeenth century French subject. Evidence of this lies in the popularity of news reports from Constantinople written by such French travelers as Antoine Galland and Donneau de Visé. French attitude towards the Ottomans was not hostile, rather, envious at what the French perceived as their own shortcomings in the area of pomp and power. Longino identifies the French as positioning themselves against reports from the Ottoman Empire as to the nature of the Turk. What came of this attitude was not a sense of inferiority, but an affirmation of supremacy that supported an emerging sense of “French cultural solidarity and, eventually, national superiority” through the creation of both a foreign people and a French people in the popular imagination. Justifying her use of the theater, Longino states that it was “the shared mental space in which the French forge for themselves, out of their contact with the Other, a collective identity, and develop a notion of themselves as members of an ‘imagined community.’”
In some works Longino treats, such as Molière’s Le bourgeois gentillhomme (1670), reference to the Turks are explicit. In others, such as Corneille’s Le Cid (1637) treat the Turk through historical metaphor. It is impossible to understand French classical theater without reference to the politically charged atmosphere in which these works appeared. While Le Cid deals with the hero Don Rodrigue and his triumphal victory over the Moors, French audiences would have understood the Moors to represent the Muslim power that ruled over the majority of the eastern and southern Mediterranean. This distinction between a Frenchman and a Turk is informed by set references to religious and secular distinctions from classical and renaissance literature. It is in these politically relevant distinctions between self and other that Longino locates the early construction of Orientalism. Unlike Said, however, Longino emphasizes not only the role of the French in shaping this discourse, but also the theatricality of the Ottomans themselves. This is recognition that the exotic was not simply imagined and constructed, but lived and experienced. For example, Corneille’s Le Médée (1634) is informed by early French ventures into colonial projects, while Le Cid deals with the threat of Moors to domestic politics. Longino skips approximately thirty-five years to deal with a slew of plays by Corneille, Racine and Molière released between 1670 and 1672, or the high point of exotic obsession in French classical theatre. Significantly, these followed closely the Ottoman diplomatic envoy of 1669,the Ottoman invasion of Austria in 1670, and the war over Crete between France and the Porte, events that were implicitly represented on the stage. Through the staging of Frenchness and otherness in the context of geopolitical rivalry, Longino maintains that the French were preparing themselves for a colonial mentality through the suggestion that they could control other cultures just as easily as they could control them on the stage.
Robert Nelson is blogger-in-chief at History News, Notes and Arguments. Find us on Google+ or on Facebook.
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Monday, September 16, 2013
Identity and the Exotic Part 2 - Economy and Diplomacy
After the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661, the young Louis XIV decided to break with tradition and rule the French realm without a prime minister. The years after 1661 saw the growth of monarchical absolutism around the person of the King; first Louis XIV, then Louis XV and Louis XVI. Beginning with Louis XIV, France embarked on a series of ambitious wars, with the twin goals of territorial expansion and European or colonial hegemony. The one hundred-and twenty-eight years between Louis XIV’s personal reign and the French Revolution also witnessed a striking “nationalist” sentiment come into existence through a near constant comparison with some “other” during these wars. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 also gave France a century of debate over religious toleration within the realm, centered mostly upon Protestants, Jansenists and Jews. The discourse over religious toleration was one strand of thought associated with the Enlightenment. By 1788, the fiscal strains of foreign policy ventures, the creation of a nationalist discourse and the intellectual “desacralization” of the monarchy were strongly responsible for the collapse of the old regime into revolution and dictatorship, leading among other things, to Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt a colonial mentality.
The history of the Ottoman Empire from the mid-seventeenth century is characterized by resurgence to power, followed by a succession of military defeats and internal reform. The second siege of Vienna (1683) ended in a full retreat, followed throughout the eighteenth century by mounting military defeats at the hands of the Russian and Austrian empires. Louis XIV himself as the “most holy king” and favored son of Catholicism was plotting an invasion of Constantinople to win it back for Christianity. Minority groups within the empire also began to exert pressure, as local leaders began to wrest autonomy from the sultan in Istanbul, and Balkan peoples began to agitate for their own self-determination. In this context, administrative decentralization away from the authority of the Körprülü viziers and the rising power of janissary elements weakened the ability of the sultan to conduct his own affairs. After the defeat at the hands of Austria and Venice cemented by the treaty of Passarowitz (1719), Sultan Ahmed III and his grand vizier Damad Ibrahim Pasha agreed on the need for reform. The reform campaign resulted in increased diplomatic contacts between Istanbul and the west, including obvious missions to gather military and technological information from willing western hosts. Culturally, this renewed turn towards the west resulted in the increasing importation of western “lifestyles,” the Tulip Era (1718-1730) being only the most visible example of European influence.
Official French interaction with the Ottoman Empire came through the related spheres of economy and diplomacy. The interaction between the two states in the seventeenth and eighteenth century is largely influenced by the legacy of the entente between Francis I and Suleiman I in the sixteenth century. The entente established a history of cordial relations interrupted by periodic conflict in which, until the French Revolution, a thriving political, economic and cultural exchange took place. According to Edhem Eldem, French trade to Istanbul was lively, and grew until 1793,when the British blockade of Marseilles permanently disrupted trade. Trade in Istanbul became increasingly internationalized, and although still dominated by French merchants, became linked to a pan-European market economy. The activities of French merchants and the ambassadors who offered protection were integral to the French domination of mercantile activity. The Expansion of French trade with the Levant is concomitant with expansion of Dutch and British trade in the Atlantic. This helps to explain relative ease with which French were able to monopolize trade. Victory was ephemeral, though, as the British would come steaming back in the nineteenth century. The so-called Levantine trade was also a part of the developing French mercantilist policy, and the liberalization of this trade in the late eighteenth century signaled a shift away from this policy.
Most of Edhem Eldem’s book concentrates upon the link between the Marseilles merchant elite and the local diplomats in Istanbul. The majority of the commodities traded from France to the Ottoman Empire were textiles produced in Languedoc, with the occasional shipment of colonial sugar or coffee. It seems Eldem does not want to claim any particular French political mission to dominate Levantine trade. He suggests that the changing role of diplomats in protecting their communities, coupled with the increasing manipulation of Ottoman import markets by France (and Great Britain) laid the groundwork for nineteenth and twentieth century commercial and political domination of the former Ottoman realms. Most interesting is not the balance of trade or the commodities involved, but the manner in which the French state and the French expatriate community in exile were able to use politics and coercion to gain a predominant place in Istanbul’s trading society in early eighteenth century. Expatriate communities formed themselves around the French ambassador in Istanbul, who offered protection based upon the principles of diplomatic extraterritoriality. The French community was self-sufficient, with administrators, priests, bakers, doctors, etc. Their presence was a product of the favoritism shown France by the Ottoman Empire.
France and the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed a special diplomatic relationship since the time of Francis I and Suleiman I, characterized by mutual trading privileges and a loose cooperation against the Habsburgs of the Holy Roman Empire and the Spanish Empire. French ambassadors had long been stationed in Istanbul to carry out the king’s diplomacy with respect to geopolitics, trade, and extraterritorial protection of the French expatriate community. Although relations were somewhat chilly because of the poor behavior of Jean de la Haye, French ambassador to Istanbul from 1638-1659, the French were nevertheless granted the equivalent of “most favored nation” status throughout the eighteenth-century. The Ottomans, on the other hand, had never had a permanent embassy in France. A series of temporary diplomatic envoys, the first in 1533 and last in 1669, carried out official business between the two states. Aside from the official diplomatic channels that passed from Istanbul through Marseilles to Paris/Versailles, the only other immediate interaction between the French people and the Islamic world is through the Corsair raiders of the Barbary Coast, whose affairs disrupted both trade at sea and society on the coast.
The Ottoman embassy of 1720-21 must be seen in the context of Ottoman military defeat and their desire for a political and military partner in the rapidly modernizing west. France proved ideal both because of her military strength and for her longstanding relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Immediately after the Passarowitz, an Ottoman scholar published a tract suggesting that it was necessary to observe European technology in order to make much needed improvements to the Ottoman army. Ahmed III and Ibrahim Pasha decided upon an embassy to France for the purposes of observation, study, and espionage, but under the guise of informing Louis XV of Ottoman plans to rebuild the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. A “man of the pen,” Mehmed Efendi was chosen for this diplomatic voyage. While the duration of the embassy was short, the impact was both important and longstanding in the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Efendi met with the king, the minister of foreign affairs and many leading notables. He was exposed the lifestyle of the French elite, and brought back new ideas to the Ottoman Empire. Among the results of his observations come the introduction of military reform, new palace construction, introduction of new consumer goods and luxury items as well as the eventual introduction of the printing press with help from European minorities in the Ottoman Empire.
Perhaps most important of all, Mehmed Efendi introduced new patterns of consumption and behavior among Ottoman elites and a taste for French goods and practices. Although there had always been a considerable population of French subjects in Istanbul and other port cities (mostly merchants, ambassadors, clerics and the artisinal population that supported them), it was never large enough to effect such widespread change as an Ottoman elite, himself familiar with this new culture, could so effectively do. This new taste for all things French also led to the opening of new markets for French luxury items. Finally, this spawned increasingly frequent diplomatic forays into Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire took part in what is referred to as the “diplomatic revolution” in the eighteenth-century, in which states and governments increasingly normalized relations with one another through a permanent diplomatic presence highlighted by embassies and official protocol. Mehmed Efendi’s son was to serve as an ambassador to France in the 1750’s before returning home, eventually to become the Grand Vizier for a very short tenure. This highlights the recognition that it was increasingly important for the Ottoman Empire to maintain a presence in the west to protect merchant activity, maintain a political alliance, and observe western technological advances.
While Fatma Göçek stresses that the introduction of western elements into Ottoman society was of permanent importance, she maintains that the introduction of Ottoman elements into French society was only of ephemeral importance. She highlights both the embassy of 1720-21 and the Suleiman Aga embassy of 1669. The 1669 embassy was influential for introducing dress “à la turque” to the court of Louis XIV. Louis, quite taken with the exotic Turks, convinced Molière to include a Turkish scene in Le bourgeois gentilhomme. Indeed, “the preromantic vogue of Orientalism and the cult of Chinoiserie permeated the art, literature, and philosophy of the age. Gardens were altered in the Oriental fashion; Chinese pottery, furniture, lacquer painting were reproduced...To have a monkey or a green parrot was a sign of luxurious refinement.” While Ottoman influence upon the arts and styles of French elite may appear to be ephemeral, their importance lies not in the temporary nature of their popularity, but the permanent influence of their representation. What Göçek fails to grasp is that by objectifying Ottoman culture and separating the stylistic elements of its design from their traditional styles, the French were creating an aesthetic, if not political other against whom their nationalist sentiments would turn.
The other source from which the French received information about the Ottoman Empire was the travelogue. French explorers like Galland, Tavernier and Chardin, among others, were the one physical link between French society and Ottoman society along with the foreign embassies in Constantinople and the merchant communities that traveled between France and the Levant. Their reports, whether accurate or not, gave the French information about the Ottoman Empire that informed attitudes towards the Orient. It was its own literary genre, between fiction and objective reportage. The information that came from the Levant was not always accurate, and the interpretation of that information was certainly the domain of the readers who could construct their own mental images from it. In describing society, culture, and art, travel writers structured their actions around timelessness and a sense of routinization that led Europeans to believe Turks were immemorial. They also referred to local inhabitants as the ubiquitous “they,” blurring any real cultural difference that exists. The transition from the “they” of the travelogues and the us/them dichotomy that positioned Orientals as the “other” is not difficult to imagine.
Travelogues were also a manner by which the author compared his/her home society with the exotic east, naturally focusing on the most foreign or most strange to their sensibilities. For this reason, the harem received extensive treatment in travelogues despite the fact that most male travelers could not penetrate the inner circle of the harem. The most important western chronicler of the harem in the early modern period was Lady Mary Wortley Montague, who, as a woman, was allowed into this sanctuary. While the genre of the travelogue contributed an immense amount of information into western intellectual discourse, they had the capacity to obscure as much as they enlightened.
Robert Nelson is blogger-in-chief at History News, Notes and Arguments. Find us on Google+ or on Facebook.
Monday, September 9, 2013
Identity and the Exotic - The Turk in Eighteenth Century French Literature - Thesis
In 1940, Professor Clarence Rouillard published a book entitled The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660) in which he claims that the cordial relationship between Francis I and Suleiman I inaugurated more than a century’s worth of exchanges that profoundly influenced French culture. This understanding between the two powers allowed for increasing economic, political and cultural interaction that resulted in the proliferation of Turkish elements within the French realm. In particular, increasing contacts in the areas of diplomacy, economy and travel, led to an extensive treatment of the Turk in French literature. Rouillard groups the treatment into two opposite tendencies. The first treatment mixes fear of invasion with a general scorn for the eastern barbarian, wholly lacking in civilized mannerisms and content to live in a corrupt and despotic society. The second treatment expresses admiration for Ottoman justice, tolerance, military power and certainly the exotic elements of style and artifice. This approach was often used as the basis for a critique of French society and culture. Although written almost seventy years ago, scholars are still largely beholden to the two-image approach when evaluating the Turk in early-modern French discourse.
French literary treatments of the Turk in exotic literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are numerous, and locating them in their contemporary political and social context demonstrates the degree to which a literary genre that relied heavily upon stereotype and hearsay played an immense role in the evolution of French self-identity. In particular, two important facets of this discourse left a legacy that influenced French society well into the twentieth century. On the one hand, treating the exotic was often a moralizing critique of either Ottoman or French society that was integral in shaping French conceptions civilization and culture. For example, citing the institution of the harem could be both a critique of an oriental despotism that oppressed women (in comparison to the civilized or humane treatment of women in France), or a critique of similar misogyny evident in French political and cultural attitudes. Similar comparisons are evident in the realms of politics and administration. On the other hand, a related discourse solidified the Turk as an “other” against whom the French could compare and construct their own cultural identity. This French identity has been both elaborated upon and critiqued in the past few decades, the most relevant of which is Edward Said’s Orientalism (1977) in which Said claims that French identity built in comparison with an oriental “other” was responsible for shaping a colonial mentality that allowed for French subjugation of oriental peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Without disputing the importance of the exotic as a literary genre, this paper attempts to relativize the role of exotic literature in identity building through three related methods. The first attempts to locate this literature in the context of political, cultural and economic exchange that shows how exotic attitudes were not simply an intellectual construct, but informed by contact and proximity. However, the contacts between the two were peripheral to the main political and social concerns of an eighteenth-century populace and thus were peripheral to the main concerns of the French intellectual community. The second method minimizes the role of the Turk in the exotic literature of the eighteenth-century by showing how the diminished power and prestige of the Ottoman Empire shifted the focus of Levantine literature away from a strictly Turkish approach. Furthermore, voyages of discovery led to an increasing knowledge and fascination with other parts of the world that provided the Enlightenment with more appropriate subjects to treat in their commentaries on society and civilization. Locating exotic discourse in the formation of French identity also assumes that this was a strictly French phenomenon; it obscures the fact that it was, by the Age of the Enlightenment, a pan-European discourse in which the French certainly participated, but not exclusively. Lastly, while this discourse was indeed important to the construction of French national identity, it was not nearly as important as the comparisons with other “others,” Great Britain being the most notable. Great Britain was a political, military and cultural threat with extreme immediacy. Consequently, the British were treated as the “other” not simply in the High Enlightenment, but much more extensively in the “low-life literature” with a wider circulation in Paris and the provinces, this paper shows how cultural interplay informed exotic literature, but that it did not necessarily lead directly to the colonial mentality that allowed for cultural subjugation in the centuries to come.
Robert Nelson is blogger-in-chief at History News, Notes and Arguments. Find us on Google+ or on Facebook.
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